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Introduction. 
The present incarnation of Britain’s leading social democratic party as ‘New’ Labour 
underlines the relevance and importance of marketing to politics.  Management discourse 
now permeates the modern electoral process.  During the 1990s leader Tony Blair aided by 
key acolytes such as Philip Gould and Peter Mandelson used marketing techniques and 
thinking to recreate a brand identity in keeping with their cautious programme for government.  
In doing so they followed on from their previous work on behalf of Blair’s predecessor, Neil 
Kinnock.  During the Kinnock era the party had undergone a fundamental change akin to a 
business evolving from a sales to a marketing driven strategic approach.  Key contemporary 
accounts of Labour have tended to reinforce the politicians’ emphasis on the novelty and 
radical departure involved in their respective projects of organisational reform (Hughes and 
Wintour,1990; Gould,1998).  This, however, is to ignore the role and work played by 
marketing techniques, personnel and thinking in earlier incarnations of what has often been 
portrayed as a traditional, conservative organisation.   
 
Based on extensive historical research and drawing on a voluminous amount of documentary 
analysis, this paper seeks to assess how and when marketing thinking and techniques first 
began to gain currency within the British Labour Party during the inter-war period.  Hitherto 
accounts have concentrated on the post-1945 period and a series of developments related to 
the main parties’ reaction to the combined impact of mass television and more pervasive 
forms of advertising.  If this equates to when British parties began to ‘sell’ themselves, 
comparatively little has been said of the earlier, inter-war period of evolution.  This 
‘production’ or, to use a more appropriate political term, ‘propaganda’ era witnessed 
politicians’ first attempts to cope with mass communication and near universal suffrage 
(Wring, 1996).  Furthermore Labour, then a relatively new electoral force, was seeking to 
capitalise on social change and challenge the established party system.  Attention now turns 
to how some in the organisation attempted to do this with recourse to rudimentary marketing 
concepts and practices. 
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‘Branding’ the Party: the Development of Image Politics. 
The enlargement of the electorate in 1918 helped awaken politicians to the campaigning 
possibilities presented by mass communications' technology.  Hitherto, electioneering had 
been largely conceived of in terms of canvassing, leafleting and platform oratory.  Though 
these activities remained an important aspect of campaigns, party strategists began to 
evaluate opportunities offered them by more novel means of propaganda in the form of film, 
broadcasting and professional advertisements.  The launch of these types of campaign 
initiatives did not prove to be easy and were dogged by problems, most commonly in the 
shape of bureaucratic inertia, internal rivalries or simply inadequate finance.  
 
Labour formed its first Press and Publicity Department in October 1917 as part of a wholesale 
organisational review which coincided with the introduction of a revised party constitution 
(Hollins, 1981, p.146).  An important initiative, this new section attempted to put the party’s 
case through either a largely hostile, privately owned print media and later a nominally 
independent state broadcasting service.  It soon became apparent to organisers that Labour 
would need to engage the electorate directly.  Most strategists argued the party ought to 
capitalise on the good will of its activist base.  A minority of organisers, however, began to 
assess alternative methods.  Inspired by the arguments of thinkers such as Graham Wallas, 
these strategists began to argue the notion of an informed electorate was problematic and 
that the best means of persuasion lay in the emerging forms of mass communication.  As 
Wallas put it, these ‘image’ based appeals would work most effectively when they called ‘up 
as many and as strong emotions as possible' (Wallas, 1948, p.84).  Such a sentiment found 
favour with many Labour veterans of the campaign trail including Philip Snowden who argued 
propagandists ought to develop themes which would resonate with, as he put it, 'very matter-
of-fact people' rather than the 'higher intellectual' (Labour Organiser, no.23, 1922). 
 
Image conscious appeals did, in a sense, form a part of early Labour appeals.  Symbols, 
banners and other insignia played a role in promoting the public profile of those trades unions 
and socialist societies responsible for launching the party in 1906 (Gorman, 1985).  
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Furthermore, commenting fifty years later, the then Conservative Chairman Lord Woolton 
praised the party’s founders for what he believed to be their inspirational choice of name: 
 'The word "Conservative" was certainly not a political asset when compared with the 
 Socialist word "Labour".  The man who first called the Socialist Party the "Labour Party" 
 was a political genius, for indeed the word "Labour" implied the party that would look 
 after the best interests of  "Labour”.' (Beattie, 1970, p.504) 
 
If the name 'Labour' was the first of several attempts to develop a 'brand' identity, the party 
saw the need to further expand on its use of symbols and 'image' management.  In 1924 the 
leadership devised a competition, inviting supporters to design a logo to replace the working 
'polo mint' like motif which had previously appeared on party literature.  Launched that year, 
the winning submission took the form of the torch, shovel and quill symbol which adorned the 
gateway of party headquarters in Walworth Road until 1995 when it was replaced by a gold 
painted replica of the current rose logo (Labour Organiser no.42, 1924).  
 
The new logo was popularised within the organisation through its sale in badge form for a 
shilling.  Another piece minted and merchandised by the party suggests Labour organisers 
appreciated the potential influence and symbolic use of ‘presidential’ imagery.  The badge in 
question, depicting Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald (Labour Organiser no.92, 1929), bore 
out an observation of Jennings in his study of this period:  'the image is not devised only out 
of policy: it is in large measure produced by personality' (Jennings, 1960, p.288).  The leader 
himself made what was perhaps a prophetic move in 1925 by announcing a competition to 
find a more modern replacement for the traditional party anthem, Jim Connell’s socialist 
anthem 'The Red Flag'.  Launched in conjunction with the sympathetic Daily Herald 
newspaper, the contest fielded 300 entries.  But, in spite of this stiff opposition, Connell’s 
song remained the party’s (Gorman, 1985, p.142).  By contrast, MacDonald dramatically 
defected from Labour whilst still leader a few years later.  
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The Development of Political Advertising. 
In his 1925 book Studying Advertising, Sir Charles Higham asserted that 'the Labour Party 
since its inception has used advertising' (Tunstall, 1964, p.166).  It was probably a remark 
made in respect of the party designers’ many visually arresting posters.  The 1906 election 
saw the appearance of 'Hope for Labour', the new organisation's first 'classic' poster.  In the 
following elections of 1910 the party commissioned quality artists such as Gerald Spenser 
Pryse to produce visual masterpieces like the arresting anti-House of Lords' design 'Labour 
Clears the Way' depicting workers storming parliament (Gorman, 1985, p.166).  No doubt 
encouraged by contributions to the agents’ journal like 'Every poster should be an electoral 
howitzer' (Labour Organiser no.18,1922), Labour used the skills of Pryse and others to launch 
and sustain a poster distribution scheme during the 1920s (Hollins, 1981, p.163).  More 
classics followed, notably the stark and striking ‘Greet the Dawn: Give Labour it’s Chance’ 
design which formed the backdrop to the party's 1923 election campaign. 
 
Having used designers and artists for some time, Labour did eventually consider hiring a 
professional advertising firm prior to the 1935 election but abandoned the idea on grounds of 
cost (Hollins, 1981, p.168).  Given this campaign proved to be one of the most expensive in 
political history, it would seem financial concerns were not the sole reason behind Labour's 
reticence to hire professional help.  Central headquarters contained elements hostile to the 
idea of using commercial expertise on the grounds they believed them to be advocates of 
unethical and crude tools of persuasion. 
 
If some Labour strategists were unhappy about using advertising agencies, the 
Conservatives' not to mention others’ activities made them think about modernising their 
propaganda material.  This was not least in part due to the fact that, during the 1920s, 
advertising grew into an industry worth around £100 million per year.  Unsurprisingly non-
commercial organisations began to assess the potential application of what Gordon Hosking 
called the 'science' of 'social advertising' (Labour Organiser no.44, 1924).   
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Despite their misgivings, certain Labour strategists were amongst those keen to explore the 
new professional publicity methods, arguing there were many parallels between the work of a 
party and an advertising agency (Labour Organiser no.28, 1923; Labour Organiser 
no.73,1927).  This contention found supported in a timely piece by George Horwill on 'The 
Psychology of Political Advertising'.  Whilst conceding that these methods could be used to 
cultivate ‘primitive emotions’, Horwill believed organisers would be well served if they 
understood the nature of commercial publicity work.  He wrote:  'The advertising side of 
elections, directly or indirectly, constitutes nine-tenths of an election organisation (and 
consists of) methods used to influence the emotions and intelligence of electors' (Labour 
Organiser no.43, 1924).  Another agent argued that limited finances should be no barrier to 
the development of an effective promotions when he wrote that the new methods were:  'An 
art we must understand and learn to apply... (A)dvertisement value is a subtle and almost 
immeasurable thing.  It is certainly not intrinsic to its cost' (Labour Organiser no.178,1936).  
One organiser even suggested the merchandising of 'Bovril' offered an ideal role model for 
effective party promotions (Labour Organiser no.175, 1936). 
 
One senior Labour politician did engage the services of professional advertising executives.  
Having overseen the re-organisation of the London County Council publicity machine, leader 
Herbert Morrison came developed a close working relationship with several business people 
sympathetic to Labour.  In planning his party's campaign for re-election in 1937, the leader 
recruited a team of professional advisers from amongst his contacts prepared to advise him 
on a voluntary basis.   Their efforts concentrated on promoting the key issues of housing, 
education and the leader.  These themes which were distilled into arresting posters featuring 
Morrison alongside children and against a backdrop of newly built LCC flats above legends 
such as 'Labour Puts Human Happiness First', ‘Labour Gets Things Done’ and ‘Let Labour 
Finish the Job’ (Donoughue and Jones, 1972, pp.209-11).  The election result helped 
vindicate the innovative Morrison campaign plan, the party winning an improved 51% share of 
the vote and thereby increasing the Labour majority on the LCC.  The marketing press of the 
day, as represented by trade journal Advertising Monthly, praised the Labour strategy 
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claiming it had even 'set the standard' for commercial operatives (Labour Organiser no.193, 
1937).  - 
 
 
Reel Images: The Development of Screen Propaganda. 
The early decades of the Twentieth Century witnessed the rapid development of the film 
industry in Britain.  Up until this period political propaganda had hitherto been thought of in 
largely print terms, so it was perhaps of some surprise when the main parties began to 
investigate the potential of cinema as a vehicle for campaigns.  Towards the end of the First 
World War the Labour Party began to receive offers of support from sympathisers involved 
with film projects: one volunteer, a Mr Greenwood, alerted headquarters to the availability of 
his 'daylight cinema van' (Hollins, 1981, p.184).  In 1919 the party appointed a body of inquiry 
to look into the possible uses of the new medium (Jones, 1987, p.139).  Reporting in 1920 
Committee Chair Sidney Webb concluded by arguing that the party should organise showings 
of films such as Les Miserables and take note of innovative schemes being pioneered by an 
American labour union in Seattle and the Scottish Miners' Federation nearer to home (Hollins, 
1981, p.186).   
 
Despite Webb's enthusiasm for the medium, the perennial concern over poor organisational 
finances proved to be a major disincentive to the party's further investment in film.  In addition 
an influential body of opinion believed resources could be better targeted strengthening 
popular and relatively cheap grassroots' activities in the form of performing drama and music 
groups (Jones, 1987, p.140).  That said there were several initiatives designed to further 
understanding of the medium.  These included the ILP Masses Stage and Film Guild (Jones, 
1987, p.142), Daisy and Raymond Postgate's Socialist Film Council (Labour Organiser 
no.160, 1934) and individual producers like Rudolph Messel (Labour Organiser no.166, 
1935).  Activist interest in film was reflected in the decision of one local party branch in 
Nottingham to produce Love and Labour, very much a period piece about a young man 
finding socialism and a sweetheart on a day trip to Southend (Labour Organiser no.162, 
1934).  However it was probably the work of the Socialist Film Council, particularly its liaisons 
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with party publicity chief WW Henderson, which helped renew Labour interest in film 
propaganda (Jones, 1987, p.143). 
 
During the 1929, 1931 and 1935 general elections Labour film propaganda was conspicuous 
by its absence.  In contrast the deployment of cinema vans by the Conservatives and their 
National government allies proved to be a popular and innovative electioneering device 
(Hollins,1981).  By devoting resources to film, the Conservatives were able to by-pass the 
major newsreel producers whose fear of the British Board of Film Censors meant they failed 
to provide meaningful political coverage (Hogenkamp, 1986).  The cinema vans project 
impressed others, including some in the Labour movement who resolved to form the Workers’ 
Film Association in the late 1930s.  War in Spain and then in Europe put paid to the 
Association’s potential role as a vehicle for the dissemination of propaganda on the domestic 
front at least.   
 
Writing in 1935 on the impact of 'Film and Television', one party commentator recognised 
that:  '(these media) have entered into political propaganda... A new and devastating form of 
propaganda is with us' (Labour Organiser, no.166, 1935).  Aside from its contents, the article 
is of additional significance for it marks the earliest recognition in Labour Organiser of the 
potential political importance of television, then a fledgling 'small screen' alternative to 
cinematic newsreels.  At that time few could have predicted that it would radically reconfigure 
British politics in the space of a single generation. 
 
 
The ‘Psychology’ of the Electorate: the Pioneers of Political Market Research. 
One of the most significant debates during the inter-war period concerned the ways in which 
Labour strategists sought to overcome an apparent lack of reliable electoral feedback.  
Having questioned their own ability to understand public opinion, several party organisers 
sought to incorporate more precise 'scientific methods' into organisational procedure.  
Organisers, notably prominent party strategist Harold Croft, also started to discuss 
electioneering in this way.  Hence the increasing reference to concepts such as the prevailing 
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'psychological appeal' (Labour Organiser no.30, 1923), the need to understand the 'political 
psychology of the moment' (Labour Organiser no.36, 1923) and thus hit the electorate's 
'human chord' (Labour Organiser no.71, 1927).  The 'scientific' form of electoral analysis 
found adherents willing to put it into practice.  Writing after the 1931 debacle, Woolwich agent 
W. Barefoot called on his party to undertake a thorough reappraisal of campaigning: 
 '...mass psychology must be scientifically studied.  Sentiment is not unworthy.  Labour's 
 job is to make it a Socialist sentiment.  Our opponents have made a study of mass 
 psychology and play it on the lowest plane.  Labour must win mass support on the 
 highest plane...  Labour's task is to evolve a technique of mass attack on the capitalist 
 system, which can be understood by the elector who never heard of Karl Marx...  We 
 want the substance of Socialism to be understood.  The meticulous wording of 
 resolutions after much cogitation at Annual Conference cuts no ice.  It is mere shadow-
 hunting.' (Labour Organiser no.126, 1931) 
 
Perhaps the most interesting evidence of the new 'scientific' view of politics came with 
publication of the highly original Labour Organiser series 'The Psychology of Political Parties'.  
The first article warned of the need to outdo prime minister Lloyd George in his ability as 'a 
past master of the psychology of the British people'.  The piece continued:  'Once we 
understand these psychological appeals and the hold they give on this or that strata of society 
we can understand better the lines upon which political policy, strategy, warfare, organisation 
and propaganda may best proceed' (Labour Organiser no.22, 1922).  A fellow commentator 
alluded to basic positioning theory when he urged fellow organisers to consider structuring 
appeals so as to reap electoral award through the winning over of non-aligned voters or 
'outsiders' (Labour Organiser no.81, 1928).  Emphasising the market analogy, another 
contributor introduced the concepts of electoral 'swing' and the 'barometer' of public opinion 
(Labour Organiser no.108, 1930). 
 
The most important evidence that inter-war Labour organisers had some rudimentary 
conception of 'market research' came in December 1922 with the publication of an article by 
Sidney Webb, the leading intellectual little remembered for his important strategic work.  
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Webb’s piece, entitled 'What is Stratified Electioneering', forms the earliest known attempt to 
segment the electorate.  In it he wrote:  'It has occurred to me, in watching the process of 
combined propaganda and advertising that we call electioneering, that one refinement of 
which it is capable is a certain amount of stratification' (Labour Organiser no.25,1922).  
Observing that mass democracy was ‘characteristically grey’, Webb argued Labour should 
consider targeting the constituent elements because, as he put it: 
‘Every elector has his own ”colour”, if we could only discover it.  He differs in character 
and circumstances, temperament and vocation, religion and recreation- and in a 
thousand other ways from his fellow men.  At present we tend to address them all in 
the same way, with the result of achieving everywhere a certain amount of “misfit”.' 
 
The 'colours', or 'strata' as Webb called them, could be placed in several categories, most 
obviously occupational classifications like liberal professional, shopkeeper, insurance agent 
and others.   
 
Sidney Webb's call for stratified electioneering struck a chord with an influential group of party 
agents.  The article itself earned the rare honour of a reprint in Labour Organiser within a 
decade of its first appearance.  In organisational terms, the most significant endorsement 
came from party secretary Arthur Henderson in the election year of 1929 (Labour Organiser 
no.89, 1929).  The official party campaign guide The Conduct of Elections, first published in 
1931, also gave prominence to Webb's analysis (McHenry, 1938, p.99).  Author Harold Croft 
formulated his own set of strata designed to segment the electorate.  Adopting what could be 
conceived of as 'psychographic' criteria, Croft chose to subdivide voters according to the 
categories of 'reliable', 'sympathisers', 'hesitants', 'opponents' and 'inert'(Croft,1945,p.4).  
Using a typology based on standard demographic rather psychographic variables, another 
agent advocated the need for organisers to make their publicity more appealing to the less 
discerning or non-partisan amongst the target segments of weak Conservatives, Liberals, 
workmen, women and certain religious observers (Labour Organiser no.54, 1925).   
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Several strategists were keen to court the support of non-traditional supporters.  In particular 
Labour organisers' interest in the middle-class vote predates the major debates concerning 
social change and the relevance of the party that took place in the late 1950s and 1960s and 
more recently in the 1980s.  As early as 1922, agent Frank Smith was urging colleagues to be 
weary of appearing to 'slag off non-manual working-class people' (Labour Organiser no.29, 
1923).  Writing the following year Herbert Morrison posed the question 'Can Labour win 
London without the Middle-classes?'  In answering in the negative, Morrison encouraged 
organisers to go on the offensive and attempt to gain the confidence and votes of what he 
called 'brainworkers' (Labour Organiser no.34, 1923).  Similarly, as at least one organiser 
noted, many professionals were not innately Conservative, not least the teachers vulnerable 
to attacks from right-wing newspapers such as the Daily Mail which were critical of so-called 
‘progressive education policies’ (Labour Organiser no.50, 1925). 
 
 
Conclusions. 
This paper has examined the historical role of marketing within the British electoral process.  
Furthermore it has been demonstrated how even ‘very old’ Labour, and organisation 
traditionally regarded as being the most resistant to change, contained influential people keen 
to experiment with new campaign techniques and ideas.  For them, image became a concern 
in addition to the issues.  To this end there were elementary moves to ‘brand’ the party such 
as the launch of the first generic logo in the mid-1920s.   
 
The burgeoning medium of commercial advertising also attracted some organisers’ interest.  
In a celebrated campaign, London Labour leader Herbert Morrison co-opted a team of 
professional consultants to help produce an ultimately successful campaign effort.  By a quirk 
of fate Morrison’s grandson, Peter Mandelson, would do the same for the national party fifty 
(not to mention sixty) years on.  Other organisers attempted to use psychological terminology 
to better understand the ‘science’ of public opinion.  The celebrated scholar and intellectual 
Sidney Webb devised a scheme akin to basic market segmentation to help fellow strategists 
to identify potential groups of target voters.  In a related development, influential party figures 
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were writing of the need to appeal to non-traditional supporters amongst the middle-class 
electorate.   
 
The pioneering efforts of Morrison, Webb and a host of other less well known party strategists 
help showcase the innovative and engaging way that British parties adapted marketing 
techniques and concepts in responding to the twin challenges of a mass electorate and mass 
communications after the First World War.  Furthermore it is also important to appreciate that, 
far from being late developers, electoral strategists became keen to devise, adapt and use 
marketing related concepts and practices in the advancement of their own campaign 
objectives.  Even Labour, an organisation that has widely been perceived to be antagonistic 
to managerial theories and techniques, showed itself willing and able to adapt.  Significantly 
this was decades before the rebranding of the party as ‘New’. 
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